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Abstrak 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui bagaimana insentif finansial mempengaruhi 
perilaku kerjasama, serta sejauh mana tabu dan tingkat konstrual (abstrak atau konkret) 
mempengaruhi keinginan untuk melakukan pertukaran. Untuk menjawab pertanyaan 
tersebut, penelitian ini melakukan studi di tiga konteks di tiga tempat yang berbeda, yaitu 
bimbingan belajar dari senior ke junior di universitas (Depok), renovasi masjid (Mojokerto), 
dan renovasi pura (Bali). Penelitian di Depok dilakukan dalam seting laboratorium, 
sedangkan penelitian di Mojokerto dan Bali dilakukan dalam seting lapangan. Di Depok, 
kami menemukan bahwa partisipan mau melakukan pertukaran tabu dan cenderung tidak 
menganggap insentif finansial dalam bimbingan belajar sebagai tabu. Di Mojokerto dan 
Bali, partisipan juga mau melakukan pertukaran, meski menganggap pertukaran tersebut 
tabu. Secara umum, partisipan juga cenderung melakukan pertukaran tabu di situasi 
konkret. 
 
Kata kunci: perilaku kerjasama, eksperimen lapangan, teori tingkat konstrual, orang Bali, 
orang Jawa. 
 
 
Abstract  
This study attempted to answer the question of how the financial incentives can influence 
cooperative behavior in situations involving taboo tradeoffs, and the extent to which 
construal levels (abstract or concrete) also influences the willingness of participants to 
perform said tradeoffs. The study was conducted by taking three different contexts, namely 
a voluntary provision of tutorials from senior students to the junior (Depok study), mosque 
renovation activities (Mojokerto study) and renovation of temples (Bali study). The study 
used laboratory experimental methods for Depok study, and field experiment for Mojokerto 
and Bali studies. In Depok, we found that students were willing to do taboo tradeoffs and 
perceived them as not taboo. However, even though Mojokerto and Bali participants 
perceived the exchange as taboo, they were willing to do it. In general, we also found that 
participants tend to contribute higher taboo tradeoffs in abstract situation. 
 
Keywords : cooperative behavior, field experiment, construal level theory, Balinese, 
Javanese 
Introduction  
Most of the studies in cooperative 
behavior consider trust and reciprocity as 
basic features (Putnam, 1995; Knack & 
Zak 2003, Knack & Keefer 1996; 
Lazzarrini, Madalozo, & Siguera, 2005; 
Algan & Cahuc, 2010) of social capital, as 
well as network and norms.  It can be 
inferred, therefore, that a society practicing 
trust, reciprocity, developing a networks 
system, and cultivating norms should have 
high social capital. 
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In Indonesia, there is a widely 
practiced value called gotong royong (lit. 
working together). In gotong royong, every 
member of a society is expected to help 
each other to achieve a common goal. 
Subejo (2004) listed the three “rules” of 
gotong royong: reciprocity, which means 
everyone provide equivalent contribution in 
a given time and expects compensation 
from it; trust, or having faith that other 
members follow the rules; and tightly knit, 
meaning that this form of cooperation 
operates in a specific relationship, such as 
family, neighborhood, or friendship, and 
meant to strengthen social bond among 
them rather than individual goals. It can be 
seen that Putnam’s concept of social 
capital is embedded in gotong royong. For 
this reason, therefore, we postulate that as 
a society, Indonesians should have high 
social capital. 
Interestingly, there are very few 
studies about cooperative behavior in 
Indonesia. Relevant studies include Scott 
(1976) who claimed that Javanese people 
were the strongest communitarian in the 
world, and Subejo (2004) who sees the 
decaying process of gotong royong among 
Central Java villagers due to 
industrialization. On the other hand, 
Balinese is still considered as holding onto 
their banjar tradition, even though there 
are also testimonials about how the 
practice is becoming unpopular among 
youth (Sumarta, 2009, personal 
communication). 
The study aims to find the extent to 
which monetary incentive, in the form of 
money, influences cooperative behavior. 
We also seek to better understand the 
mechanism of cooperative behavior, 
especially among Javanese and Balinese. 
Our findings may play a part to the 
strengthening of Indonesia’s social 
capital, as well as a theoretical contribution 
to economic psychology. 
Social Dilemma and Cooperation. 
Some of the earliest psychological studies 
on social dilemma and cooperation were 
Dawes (1991) and De Cramer and Van 
Vugt (1999), and still being done until 
recent times (for review see Biel et al., 
2008). The underlying question of these 
studies is why people still decided to 
cooperate, while not cooperating would 
make them better off. Initially, the 
conclusion was that free-riding, as the 
practice was called, was done not only out 
of selfish motivations, but also because the 
lack of trust. Greed and fear of not getting 
equal response (reciprocity) was found as 
factors as well. Furthermore, Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) developed the inequality 
aversion theory, which assume that people 
dislike inequality, and the feeling escalate 
when they incur the worst loss. 
Beside inequality aversion, other 
studies also found power as a factor 
influencing reciprocity (Narhetali, 2009), 
and the link between hierarchical power 
and group culture (Kopelman, 2009). In 
our understanding, in the context of 
banjar and gotong royong, the interaction 
between hierarchical factor and trust and 
reciprocity is not studied yet. There is, 
however, an Indonesian study that found 
gender and the understanding that one’s 
wellbeing is self-sustained affect 
reciprocity but not trust (Narhetali, Nisa, & 
Syaebani, 2010). 
The majority of studies on social 
dilemma focus on punishment to increase 
cooperation (Fehr & Gachter, 2000). 
However, it is not relevant to banjar or 
gotong royong, since both are regulated 
by tradition, and there is little room for 
change in tradition; in banjar, for example, 
a verdict is given through voting. This 
reduces the emergence of non-strategic 
factors such as anger (Rabin, 1993; Falk 
& Fischbacher, 2006) or inequality 
aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) as the 
basis of punishment. 
There is very few research in 
cooperative behavior in Indonesia. Among 
them are Subejo (2004), which studied 
about gotong royong in farming 
communities, Warren (1999) about the 
differences between adat and dinas in 
banjar; Lietaer and De Meulenaere (2003), 
which analyzed banjar from an economic 
perspective, and a study on public goods 
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in banjar  (Veszteg & Narhetali, 2010). 
Both gotong royong and banjar, as 
traditional cooperation mechanisms, are 
driven by values of non-monetary nature 
such as trust, reciprocity, and putting 
shared interests above personal ones. 
Therefore, the decline of cooperative 
behavior can be explained as a result of a 
shift in value, from non-monetary to 
monetary values. 
According to the resource theory 
(Foa, 1971; Foa & Foa (in Foa, Converse, 
Tornblom & Foa, 1993), resource is 
defined as anything that can be 
transmitted in interpersonal relationship. 
Furthermore, “anything” in the definition 
refers to items, abstract or concrete, that 
are the object of the transaction. In 
addition, according to said theory, there 
are 6 types of reward and punishment 
transmitted through the exchange: love, 
status, information, money, goods, and 
service. 
Given the consequences, the 
exchange between the six types of 
resources that have the effect of different 
and often not simple. This phenomenon is 
confirmed by the Fiske and Tetlock (1997) 
which states that taboo trade-offs is the 
comparative form of mental, social or any 
transaction which violates or values and 
beliefs that have long held about integrity, 
and even sacredness, in relations between 
individuals or between communities and 
individuals. Furthermore, people in general 
believe that things like love, respect or 
justice, or things that are pushing the 
primacy of values of life is sacred (sacred), 
which therefore would be taboo if 
exchanged with things who are secular or 
monetary, such as money (Tetlock, 2003; 
McGraw & Tetlock, 2005). 
Exchanges between the six types of 
resources are differed, and often 
complicated. Fiske and Tetlock (1997) 
stated that taboo tradeoffs violate deeply-
held normative intuition about the integrity 
and sanctity of relationships between 
individuals or between a community and 
an individual. In general, people believe 
that concepts like love, respect, and 
justice, or sentimental objects to be taboo 
to be exchanged with secular or monetary 
objects such as money (Tetlock, 2003; 
McGraw & Tetlock, 2005). 
On abstract and concrete objects, 
Liberman and Trope (2008) and Liberman 
and Wakslak (2007) propose construal 
level theory, which describes abstract and 
concrete concept as a function of 
psychological distance. The more abstract 
the object, the lower its construal level; 
accordingly, the more concrete the object, 
the higher its construal level. The 
distance in this concept is not only limited 
to geographic distance, but also space, 
time, and many other social dimension. 
 
Research Methods 
Depok Study. The practice of 
seniors giving academic guidance to 
juniors is an organized tradition among 
generations of psychology students in 
Universitas Indonesia (UI). It is seen as a 
voluntary act, without the need of juniors 
to give anything back. It is, therefore, not 
usual to introduce monetary transaction 
into the mix. This study aims to seek the 
effect of said transaction, in different 
construal levels, to cooperative behavior 
among psychology students in UI. We 
also use findings from this study as a 
basis for the Mojokerto and Bali studies. 
Participants and Design. Participants 
in this study were undergraduate 
psychology students in UI. The study 
design is 2 (type of exchange: taboo v. 
routine, between subject) x 2 (construal 
level: abstract v. concrete, within subject) 
mixed design. They were informed about 
the study through posters, short messages, 
and Facebook. Sixty students, aged 17-
22 (M = 19.175, SD = 1.054), participated 
in the study. Upon arrival, participants 
were given Rp10,000 for coming to the 
study (“show-up” fee), and then another 
Rp10,000 endowments while participating. 
At random, all 60 participants were 
assigned to two groups, those with taboo 
treatment and routine treatment, and 
placed on two different rooms to work 
parallelly. We had to exclude one 
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participant from further analysis for failure 
of following instructions. 
Materials and Procedures. The 
experiment was held in a 6x6 meter 
classroom. Participants were asked to 
declare their consent, and then randomly 
assigned to numbers which will be used as 
their identification throughout the study. 
They were also told that 1) the study is 
about decision making, 2) the decision that 
they will make is confidential, and 3) they 
should not discuss about their decision with 
fellow participants. The apparatuses were 
then given one by one: data control sheet, a 
scenario sheet, endowment fee (in an 
envelope), and a questionnaire. Participants 
were then asked to complete the sheets as 
instructed. Once finished, participants were 
debriefed. The whole process took about 30 
minutes to complete. 
In the taboo group, participants were 
given the choice of paying tutors with 
money. The practice is considered taboo 
because the tutorial program is traditionally 
a voluntary movement—as an expression 
of compassion to maintain good relation 
and closeness between students. Involving 
money would violate the sacredness of this 
value, as suggested by Fiske and Tetlock 
(1997). We also asked how participants 
rate how taboo the practice described in 
the passage is, using a Likert scale of 1 
(not taboo at all) to 6 (strongly taboo). The 
following is the English translation of the 
scenario to be read by the participants in 
the taboo group: 
 
You are a member of the 
student board, and also the one 
responsible for the academic 
tutor program. This program is 
where seniors can provide 
valuable academic tutorial to 
their juniors, especially around 
exam season, out of 
compassion. 
Right now, you are holding a 
meeting with juniors, or tutees, 
to hear about how the program 
went for them. Generally, the 
tutees are satisfied with the 
program, since they reported 
good score in tests. Upon 
seeing this good result, the 
board’s chairman proposed the 
idea of paying some money to 
tutors. This practice has never 
been done before, so there is 
no budget allocation available. 
The solution is to ask tutees to 
pay for the program. The 
chairman also urges board 
members, including you, to 
contribute as well. 
 
Next, participants were given an 
envelope containing Rp20.000, a 
combination of their show-up and 
endowment fee. Participants were then 
asked to state, by writing in a paper, how 
much money they will contribute if they 
were either a tutee (abstract situation) or a 
board member (concrete situation). They 
can contribute none, all, or only a part of 
their money. 
The same procedure was applied to 
the routine group. The following is the 
English translation of the scenario to be 
read by the participants in the routine 
group: 
 
You are a member of the 
student board, and also the one 
responsible for the academic 
tutor program. This program is 
where seniors can provide 
valuable academic tutorial to 
their juniors, especially around 
exam season, out of 
compassion. 
Right now, you are holding a 
meeting with juniors, or tutees, 
to hear about how the program 
went for them. Generally, the 
tutees are satisfied with the 
program, since they reported 
good score in tests. Upon 
seeing this good result, the 
board’s chairman proposed the 
idea of giving the tutor a gift. 
They decided to give either 
cake or a book the tutor likes, 
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depending on how much money 
they can raise. You are 
intrigued and willing to help. 
 
Mojokerto Study. In 2006, there 
was a school-building project in 
Mojokerto, East Java, which end up costing 
Rp125 million instead of the projected Rp50 
million. The drastic increase was possible 
because the people of Padang Asri District, 
where the school was built, decided to 
contribute not only manpower, but also 
materials. This is not a common form of 
gotong royong, but still embodies its 
principles. This is the rationale of 
choosing Padang Asri District as the site 
for this study.  
Participants and Design. The 
study design is 2 (type of exchange: 
taboo v. routine, between subject) x 2 
(construal level: abstract v. concrete, 
within subject) mixed design. Participants 
of this study were 78 locals from Padang 
Asri District, with ages range 15-52 years 
(M = 24,961, SD = 9,636). They were 
recruited during a pengajian (Islamic 
religious gathering) in the village hall. The 
recruitment was done in two days, with the 
help from local community leaders as well 
as a school principal, which proven 
effective since people in Padang Asri 
understand Javanese language better 
than Indonesian. Group assignment was 
done by placing participants who came in 
the first day to taboo group, and those 
who came in the second to routine group. 
Thirty-six participants were in the taboo 
group. Like participants in the Depok 
study, they also received Rp10,000 show-
up fee and another Rp10,000 as 
endowment. 
Materials and Procedures. The 
experiment was held in the village hall. 
Participants were asked to declare their 
consent, and then randomly assigned to 
numbers which will be used as their 
identification throughout the study. They 
were also told that 1) the study is about 
decision making, 2) the decision that they 
will make is confidential, and 3) they 
should not discuss about their decision 
with fellow participants. The apparatuses 
were then given one by one: data control 
sheet, a scenario sheet, endowment fee 
(in an envelope), and a questionnaire. 
Participants were then asked to complete 
the sheets as instructed. Once finished, 
participants were debriefed. The whole 
process took about 45 minutes to 
complete. 
Like in the Depok study, participants 
in both groups were asked to read a 
passage and to write a certain amount of 
monetary contribution. The following is 
the English translation of the scenario to 
be read by the participants in the taboo 
group in Mojokerto: 
 
You are a resident of Benang 
Sari Village. In your village, the 
people often contribute in 
renovation projects voluntarily, 
either as direct, physical 
contributor or being a committee 
member. Today, your village’s 
only mosque is going to be 
renovated since it is no longer 
safe and comfortable to use, 
and you decided to volunteer as 
the head of committee. 
However, there are too few 
villagers who are willing to 
participate in the of program. To 
tackle this problem, the village 
chief offered an idea to provide 
contributors with fee money. 
This idea has never been done 
before, as contributors were 
instead given snacks and 
beverages from other, idle 
villagers. Therefore, there is no 
fee budget available to the 
program. The solution was to 
ask idle villagers to raise 
money. The chief also asks the 
committee, you included, for 
their share of monetary 
contribution. 
 
The following is the English 
translation of the scenario to be read by 
the participants in the routine group: 
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You are a resident in Benang 
Sari Village. In your village, the 
people often contribute in 
renovation projects voluntarily, 
either as direct, physical 
contributor or being a committee 
member. Today, your village’s 
only mosque is going to be 
renovated since it is no longer 
safe and comfortable to use, 
and you decided to volunteer as 
a committee member. In a 
committee meeting, it was 
decided that people need to 
give back to those giving their 
physical contribution as a token 
of gratitude. The alternatives 
are either cakes or batik shirts, 
depending on how much money 
the villagers, including you as 
the head of committee, can 
raise. 
 
After reading the scenario, 
participants were also asked to rate how 
taboo the activity was. Then, they were 
given Rp20.000 to be used in the study. 
They were then asked to write down how 
much money they would contribute if they 
were the head of committee (abstract 
situation) and villager (concrete situation). 
Bali Study. In Bali, there is an 
additional layer of official government 
called Banjar. Administratively, Banjar is 
positioned under administrative village 
(Kelurahan). However, unlike formal 
government, a Banjar is more socially 
motivated, with things organized included 
religious events, land sales, and, most 
relevant to this study, temple renovation. 
Details about the subject can be seen in 
Veszteg & Narhetali (2010) 
Participants and Design. The 
study design is 2 (type of exchange: 
taboo v. routine, between subject) x 2 
(construal level: abstract v. concrete, 
within subject) mixed design. Participants 
in this study were 74 residents (aged 21-
60, M = 38.067, SD = 9,213) from three 
different villages in Bali: Nyuhtebel, 
Karang Asem; Padang Bai, Klungkung; 
and Bedugul, Tabanan. Much like in 
Mojokerto, we received help from a local, 
who also happen to be in the research 
team. Participants received Rp10,000 for 
coming to the study and Rp10,000 
endowment fee. 
Materials and Procedures. Similar 
to the Mojokerto study, this study was 
held in the village hall. However, in 
Padang Bai, we had to do the experiment 
near the locals’ workplace for they are at 
work at the time of data collection. 
Participants were asked to declare their 
consent, and then randomly assigned to 
numbers which will be used as their 
identification throughout the study. They 
were also told that 1) the study is about 
decision making, 2) the decision that they 
will make is confidential, and 3) they 
should not discuss about their decision 
with fellow participants. The apparatuses 
were then given one by one: data control 
sheet, a scenario sheet, endowment fee 
(in an envelope), and a questionnaire. 
Participants were then asked to complete 
the sheets as instructed. Once finished, 
participants were debriefed. The whole 
process took about 45 minutes to 
complete. 
The procedure was the same as 
Depok and Mojokerto studies, where 
participants in both groups were asked to 
read the scenario and write a certain 
amount of monetary contribution. The 
following is the English translation of the 
scenario to be read by the participants in 
the taboo group in Bali: 
 
You are a resident of Banjar 
[banjar name]. In your village, 
the people often contribute in 
renovation projects voluntarily, 
either as direct, physical 
contributor or being a committee 
member. Today, your banjar’s 
temples are going to be 
renovated since they are no 
longer safe and comfortable to 
use, and you decided to 
volunteer as the head of 
committee. However, there are 
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too few villagers who are willing 
to participate in the of program. 
To tackle this problem, the 
banjar chief offered an idea to 
provide contributors with fee 
money. This idea has never 
been done before, as 
contributors were instead given 
snacks and beverages from 
other, idle villagers. Therefore, 
there is no fee budget available 
to the program. The solution 
was to ask idle villagers to raise 
money. The chief also asks the 
committee, you included, for 
their share of monetary 
contribution. 
 
The following is the English 
translation of the scenario to be read by 
the participants in the routine group: 
 
You are a resident of Banjar 
[banjar name]. In your village, 
the people often contribute in 
renovation projects voluntarily, 
either as direct, physical 
contributor or being a committee 
member. Today, your banjar’s 
temples are going to be 
renovated since they are no 
longer safe and comfortable to 
use, and you decided to 
volunteer as a committee 
member. In a committee 
meeting, it was decided that 
people need to give back to 
those giving their physical 
contribution as a token of 
gratitude. The alternatives are 
either cakes or batik shirts, 
depending on how much money 
the villagers, including you as 
the head of committee, can 
raise. 
After reading the scenario, 
participants were also asked to rate how 
taboo the activity was. Then, they were 
given Rp20.000 to be used in the study. 
They were then asked to write down how 
much money they would contribute if they 
were the head of committee (abstract 
situation) and villager (concrete situation). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Depok Study: Manipulation Check. 
The assumption in this study is that the 
Indonesian people are now experiencing 
a shift from the values of collectivity, 
cooperation, and mutual aid to more 
materialistic values. Therefore, it is no 
longer taboo for participants in Depok to 
give or to receive money in activities that 
require mutual cooperation (i.e 
volunteering to be tutors). Manipulation 
check results supported this assumption 
by showing that giving money to the 
tutors in order to increase the desire to 
continue tutoring was considered “slightly 
taboo” (M = 2.423, SD = 1.06). 
Depok Study: Types of 
exchanges. Our analysis showed that 
there was no significant difference 
between  taboo and routine condition (F = 
.218, p <.643, ηp2 = .004). This is most 
likely due to participants’ perceptions that 
the exchange was not taboo. However, 
given the very low number of partial eta 
squared acquired (= .004), the small 
sample size can also be a factor causing 
these differences are not significant. 
On the other hand, there is a 
significant difference in average 
contributions made in both abstract and 
concrete conditions (F = 4783, p <.05, ηp2 
= .08). Interestingly, participants in 
abstract-taboo condition contributed 
significantly more than participants in 
 
Table 1. Average Contribution in Depok Study 
 
 N Abstrak SE Kongkrit SE 
Rutin 30 7.783,33 785,24  10.950,00 613,17  
Tabu 27 9.555,55 827,76  8.740,74 646,34  
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abstract-routine condition. While on the 
contrary, when presented with concrete 
situation, participants in routine condition 
contributed significantly more than 
participants in taboo condition.  
This results indicate the presence of 
emotional strain in participants when 
making decision containing elements of 
taboo in concrete condition. This 
emotional strain seems to actually 
encourage the opposite response in the 
abstract condition, so that the average 
contribution of the participants for making 
decisions that contain elements of taboo 
in the abstract condition even greater 
than on purely routine decisions. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average Contribution in 
Depok Study 
 
 
Analysis of Motivation. Analysis of 
participants' motivation to contribute 
conducted qualitatively by two people 
with a method of inter-raters. In abstract-
taboo condition, participants showed 
varied motivations, namely: 1) being the 
more benefited party, 2) being the 
indirectly benefited, 3) rational reasons, 
that when the person considers market 
price before contributing, and the fact that 
other people will contribute as well.  
The motivation of participants in 
concrete–taboo conditon were identified 
as two major answers:1) rational reason, 
and, and 2) reward, this motivation has 
not yet appeared in the previous 
category, where the participants felt the 
urge to compensate justly for the tutor and 
as a symbol of gratitude. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Composition in Depok Study 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a. Motivation in Abstract-
Routine Condition 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b. Motivation in Concrete-
Routine Condition 
 
 
Participants in concrete-routine 
condition demonstrated exactly the same 
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motivations as participants in concrete-
taboo condition: 1) rational and 2) reward. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2c. Motivation in Abstract-Taboo 
Condition 
 
In abstract-taboo condition, participants’ 
motivations were categorized in 5 major 
answers: 1) they considered themselves as 
the benefited party, or 2) as indirectly-
benefited part, 3) rational reasons, 4) 
fairness (mutual benefit tradeoff between 
tutor and tutee), and 5) reward (i. e. by 
contributing, the person feels like saying 
thank you). 
Mojokerto Study: Manipulation 
Check. Manipulation check results showed 
that giving money to villagers in order to 
increase the desire to volunteer in mosque 
renovation was considered “somewhat 
taboo” (M = 3.22, SD = 1.551).  
Mojokerto Study: Types of 
Exchanges. The average contribution 
from participants in routine group was 
significantly lower than their taboo 
counterpart (F = 4.249, p <.05, ηp2 = 
.053). Such result might occur because, as 
indicated in the manipulation check, 
participants regard the exchange as taboo. 
However, given the very low number of 
partial eta squared acquired (= .004), the 
small sample size can also be a factor 
causing these differences are not 
significant On the other hand, unlike the 
Depok study, there was no difference 
between the contributions made in abstract 
and concrete situations (F = 3529, p> .05, 
ηp2 = .044). However, like the Depok 
study, average contribution to taboo 
exchange was higher when done in 
abstract situation—the opposite dynamics 
was in play in concrete situation. This 
finding aligns with our tension theory from 
before, that it happened when participants 
faced taboo exchange in concrete 
situation. The tension encouraged an 
opposite response, that is to contribute 
higher. 
However, the same trends, namely 
that in an abstract context, contributing to 
the condition taboo higher than routine 
conditions. While on the contrary, in the 
context of concrete, contributing to a 
higher condition than routine conditions 
taboo. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Average Contribution in 
Mojokerto Study 
 
Bali Study: Manipulation Check. 
Manipulation check results showed that 
giving money to villagers in order to 
increase the desire to volunteer in temple 
renovation was considered “somewhat 
taboo” (M = 3.926, SD = 1.967). 
Bali Study: Types of Exchange. 
There was no difference of average 
contribution between taboo and routine 
groups (F = 3.406, p> .05, ηp2 = .045). 
Such result might occur because, as 
indicated in the manipulation check, 
participants regard the exchange as taboo. 
However, given the very low number of 
partial eta squared acquired (= .045), the 
small sample size can also be a factor 
causing these differences are not 
significant. Larger group could potentially 
make a clearer distinction. 
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Table 2 Average Contribution in Mojokerto Study 
 
 N Abstract  SE Concrete  SE 
Routine 42 5.190,48 439,404 4.500,00 438,452 
Taboo 36 5.555,56 509,38 6.777,78 710,997 
 
 
Table 3. Average Contribution in Bali Study 
 
 N Abstrak SE Kongkrit SE 
Rutin 33 8.181,82 444,781 5.878,789 505,195 
Tabu 41 7.853,68 400,169 6.792,683 446,181 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Average Contribution in Bali 
Study 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5a. Contribution Comparisons 
Between Mojokerto and Bali Studies 
 
 
Results and Interactions: Mojokerto 
& Bali Studies. Participants in Bali study 
showed significantly higher contribution in 
both abstract and concrete condition than 
Mojokerto. (F = 6.903, p <.05, ηp2 = .045). 
This implies that Bali participants were more 
generous in terms of contributing for the 
benefit of the community. This was likely to 
happen because of the Balinese ngayah 
philosophy, meaning to expect nothing but 
God’s blessing. It was proven by the higher 
manipulation check score than Mojokerto 
participants, which means that Bali 
participants consider the monetary 
exchange as more taboo. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5b. Contribution Comparisons 
Between Mojokerto and Bali Studies 
 
 
The average contribution from Bali 
participants in both abstract and concrete 
situation was significantly higher than 
Mojokerto (F = 6.903, p <.05, ηp2 = .045). 
This implies that they were more generous 
Mojokerto participants in terms of 
contribution in the context of collaborative 
action for the benefit of the community. Both 
groups of participants also experienced the 
tension effect, which lead them to contribute 
more in taboo exchange when the situation 
is concrete. 
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Conclusions 
In Depok, it was shown that 
participants did not consider volunteerism in 
tutorial activities as sacred and need to be 
maintained; the majority of students saw the 
act of exchanging tutorial and money was 
seen as not taboo. However, originally, the 
students agree that monetary exchange 
violates the value rooted in the tutorial 
program, but when the exchange is framed 
as a way to appreciate the time and effort 
given by the tutors, it becomes acceptable. 
This may show that financial incentive is no 
longer considered taboo, and more 
accepted as a means of exchange. This 
phenomenon can be explained by the fact 
that the students live in a city, where 
material needs are normally high. On the 
other hand, taken to a community context, 
the opposite occurred. In Mojokerto, regard 
financial incentive as slightly taboo, while 
the Balinese were no different. 
From the amount of contribution given, 
there was no difference found between 
taboo and routine groups among UI 
students, both in abstract and concrete 
situations. This corresponds to our previous 
finding where the students regard financial 
incentive as not taboo. Likewise, Mojokerto 
and Bali participants showed similar amount 
of contributions between the two groups. 
There are two possible explanations: failed 
manipulation and a shift to a more 
materialistic lifestyle. However, we believe 
the latter to be more probable, since 1) 
manipulation check result revealed that both 
Mojokerto and Bali participants consider 
giving financial incentive to volunteers as 
taboo, although only slightly. In addition, our 
motivation analysis stated that participants 
viewed the incentive was reasonable 
because volunteers need it. On the other 
hand, those who reject the idea did so 
because they consider the renovation as a 
holy deed, hence they should do it only to 
seek God’s blessing, not for financial 
reasons. 
The amount of contribution in Depok 
and Mojokerto were significantly higher in 
abstract than concrete situation. However, it 
was not the case in Bali. A plausible 
explanation is because for Balinese, temple 
renovation is more of a form of worship than 
social activity. Therefore, they were 
indifferent towards whether they were the 
head of committee (abstract situation) or a 
villager (concrete situation). 
Another interesting finding is that 
participants in Depok, Mojokerto, and Bali 
tend to contribute higher in abstract-taboo 
situation than abstract-routine. This could 
probably happen because in abstract 
situation, people see the problem (taboo 
tradeoffs) less clearly. On the other hand, in 
concrete situation, participants contribute 
more on routine than taboo exchange. 
These results implied that there are taboo 
beliefs that held participants from 
contributing higher—because when they 
see taboo tradeoffs clearly, they tend to opt 
for the “safer” decision that is routine 
tradeoff. 
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